Buffalo Human Rights Law Review
Volume 12

Article 7

9-1-2006

Assessing the Collateral International Consequences of the U.S.'
Removal Policy
Tara Pinkham

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/bhrlr
Part of the Immigration Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Tara Pinkham, Assessing the Collateral International Consequences of the U.S.' Removal Policy, 12 Buff.
Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 223 (2006).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/bhrlr/vol12/iss1/7

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Human Rights Law Review by an authorized
editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

ASSESSING THE COLLATERAL
INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE
U.S.' REMOVAL POLICY
Tara Pinkham*
Since the passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (AEDPA) 1 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) 2 in 1996, the number of aliens who may be removed
from the United States (U.S.) without relief has greatly increased. These
two acts enlarged "the class of aliens subject to deportation by increasing
the number of offenses that could constitute aggravated felonies," 3 thereby
eliminating the availability of equitable relief from removal. 4 IIRIRA is
also applied retroactively so aliens are potentially removable for crimes that
they committed over twenty years ago.5 Removal of so-called "criminal
aliens" (hereinafter "criminal aliens" or "criminal deportees") is an enforcement priority in the U.S. as the U.S. government aims to "'identify and
remove criminal aliens and minimize recidivism.' "6
As a result of increased enforcement in criminal alien removals, the
change in the definition of an aggravated felony, as well as the lack of
equitable relief from removal, the number of alien removals markedly in* J.D., State University of New York at Buffalo Law School, 2006; B.A., Syracuse University, 2002. The author would like to thank her Dad, Josh, Johan and
Jennie for their encouragement, her Aunt Marianne and Uncle John for their guidance, and Sophie Feal for her mentoring.
1 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
2
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).
3 M. Isabel Medina, Demore v. Kim - A Dance of Power and Human Rights, 18
GEO. IMMGR. L.J. 697, 707 (Summer 2005).
4
IIRIRA has taken discretion away from immigration judges in that they may
not grant equitable relief to aliens based on factors such as family ties, business
ties, employment history, rehabilitation, and other significant connections to the
U.S. See Columbia International Affairs Online, CriminalAliens and Immigration:
Taking Stock and Looking Ahead, Feb. 10, 1999, http://www.ciaonet.org/conf/
cei08/cei08.html.
5 Mark Bradford, Deporting Nonviolent Aliens: Misapplication of 18 U.S.C.
§ 16(b) to Aliens Convicted of Driving Under the Influence, 52 DEPAUL L. REv.
901, 909-10 (Spring 2003).
6

CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES,

FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAW ENFORCE-

PROCEDURES AND COMPLAINTS, par. 5, available at http://www.cis.org/
articles/2001/crime/law.html (quoting 146 Cong. Rec. D 167-01 (daily ed. Mar.
2000) (testimony of Comm'r Doris Meissner)).
MENT:
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creased in 1997. In 1996, the U.S. removed a total of 69,588 aliens of
which 36,203 removals were due to criminal convictions; the following
year, however, the U.S. removed an astonishing 114,292 aliens of which
7
49,768 removals were due to criminal convictions.
Since "[c]riminal aliens [have become] uniformly perceived as a
threat to public safety," 8 it therefore follows that the American public generally supports the policy of removing aliens convicted of certain crimes.
Although the U.S.' removal policy is considered a success in some regards,
it is short-sighted since the U.S. has failed to assess the policy's international repercussions. This paper will focus on the effects of the U.S.' removal policy on countries that receive removed aliens (hereinafter referred
to as "receiving countries").
The first part of this paper will focus on the troublesome aspects of
the U.S.' removal policy. The second part of this paper will examine the
effects that these removals have on receiving countries, specifically in Haiti
and Central America. It will further examine the receiving countries' reactions to those effects and how those reactions may have future repercussions in the U.S. Lastly, this paper will offer suggestions to remedy the
difficult predicament that receiving countries encounter as a result of U.S.'
removal practices.

THE U.S.'

TROUBLESOME REMOVAL PROCESS

To effectuate its streamlined removal process, the U.S. government
implements procedures that raise red flags for U.S. foreign policy and
human rights practices. The U.S.' removal process does not require that the
receiving country accept the alien before removing her. 9 In addition, the
U.S. government has attempted to remove criminal aliens to territories
where there is no government and the U.S. government fails to forewarn the
receiving countries' governments that criminal aliens will be removed to
their territories. In practice, the U.S. government violates international
human rights law and disregards the collateral effects its policy has on receiving countries.
First, U.S. regulations do not require receiving countries to accept
removed aliens before deporting the aliens to the receiving countries. 10 The
7

Id.

Teresa Miller, Blurring The Boundaries Between Immigration And Crime Control After September l1th, 25 B.C. Third World L.J. 81, 118 (Winter 2005).
9 Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement [hereinafter ICE], 543 U.S. 335
(2005).
10 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(f) (2006).
8
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Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General recognize that
"the actual removal of the alien by [the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS)] is generally not predicated on any acceptance of the alien into any
specific country."'" DHS acknowledges that acceptance by the receiving
country is desirable, but "national security concerns, including foreign policy concerns, as well as other Executive Branch interests might deem re12
moval appropriate even in the absence of acceptance.
Receiving countries are less likely to cooperate with U.S.' removal
efforts if the U.S. government disregards their refusals to accept criminal
aliens. Instead, the receiving countries are more likely to hinder efforts to
effectively and efficiently remove these aliens. Some countries "have devised ways to make the [removal] process more lengthy and costly for the
[U.S. government]" by failing to admit the alien or by refusing to administer the proper travel documents. 3 Other countries like "Cuba, Laos, and
Vietnam, flatly refuse to take back their criminals, making the U.S. the
4
government by default of effectively stateless alien criminals."'
A second issue regarding the U.S.' removal process is that an alien
may be removed to a country without a government. The Secretary of
Homeland Security and the Attorney General explain that "it does not follow ... that the removal of aliens to the territory of such a receiving coun-

try must cease until a 'government' is organized, or until that government is
recognized."'1 5 The Supreme Court decision in Jama v. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement 6 raises concern that the U.S. will remove Somali
refugees and aliens to Somalia which has not had a government since 1991.
Even though Jama did not address this issue specifically and only decided
that the U.S. does not need advance consent from the receiving country to
remove an alien or refugee,1 7 the practical effect of this decision is that the
U.S government could remove an alien to a country without a government,
especially since the receiving country's government's consent is not
needed.
There are presently over 3,500 deportable Somalis in the U.S. who
worry about losing their lives if they are removed to a territory without a
11 Execution of Removal Orders: Countries to Which Aliens May Be Removed,
69 Fed. Reg. 137, 42904 (July 19, 2004).
12

Id.
supra note 6, at 5.

13

CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES,

14

Id.

15

Execution of Removal Orders: Countries to Which Aliens May Be Removed,

supra note 11.
16

Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335 (2005).

17

Id. at 352.
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government. 18 The State Department has even labeled Somalia as "extremely dangerous" and closed the U.S. embassy in Somalia in 1991.19
Human rights activists are concerned that Somali refugees and aliens could
be removed to Somalia especially because, since there is no recognized
government in Somalia, there is no entity that will protect or enforce human
rights throughout the territory. 20 Though the U.S. maintains no embassy in
Somalia, the U.S. will remove a petty criminal refugee to this extremely
dangerous environment. 21 The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees (Refugee Convention) Article 3322 prohibits states from returning
refugees to territories where their lives would be threatened on account of a
protected status. The U.S. acceded to the 1967 Protocol to the Refugee
Convention in which it agreed to follow Article 33 of the Refugee Conven-

18 Jennifer Yau & Betsy Cooper, Supreme Court Addresses Deportation Cases,
DHS Undergoes Leadership and Oversight Changes, MIGRATION INFORMATION
SOURCE, Feb. 1, 2005, available at http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/
print.cfm?ID=286; Mary Beth Sheridann, For Somalis, a Home and Haven, Residents of U.S. Fight Deportationas Too Dangerous,WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2002,

at A4.
19

Sheridann, supra note 18; U.S. STATE DEP'T, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
NOTE: SOMALIA (2005), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/
bgn/2863.htm. Great Britain granted Somalia independence in June 1960. Somalia
was later united with Italian Somaliland after it gained independence that same
BACKGROUND

year. The Somali Prime Minister, Mohamed Ibrahim Egal was ousted in a bloodless coup in October 1969 and was replaced with Major General Mohamed Siad
Barre as President. This coup ended Somali's party-based constitutional democracy. In the 1980s, armed opposition groups to Barre's government developed in
the north of Somalia. These groups quickly spread to the central and southern
regions. The Somali army then collapsed and former soldiers rejoined their old
clan militias. Barre lost control of all of the Somali territory except for the area
around Mogadishu. In 1991, Barre was driven out of power and the Somali government collapsed. After the government collapsed, "factions organized around
military leaders to take control of Somalia." Id. Small wars were fought between
rival factions. Some areas of Somalia declared independence or autonomy. Id.
20 Mary Beth Sheridann, supra note 18.
21 The U.S. government attempted to remove Jama to Somalia in April 2005 but
its attempt was unsuccessful since there were no Somali government officials to
issue a passport. Jama v. ICE, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10614 (D. Minn. Apr. 7,
2005), 10-16 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 15 (Aug. 15, 2005).
22 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33, adopted on July 28,
1951, 19 U.S.T. 6529, 2545 U.N.T.S. 137.
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tion. 23 Article 33 does not prohibit the sending country from refouling 24 a
refugee whom it deems a security threat. A petty criminal, however, is not
a national security threat and therefore should not be refouled to a country
with no existing government.
Moreover, aggravated felons who are removed to Somalia may not
have relief under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). 25 Although an alien who is
removable as an aggravated felon may otherwise be eligible for CAT relief,
it is uncertain whether such relief would be granted in the case of the
Somalis. CAT relief requires that the torture be "inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity. '26 Because Somalia has no formal
government, Somalia does not have government officials or anyone who
27
acts in an official capacity. Therefore, CAT claims may be easily denied.
Thus, if the U.S. government attempts to remove refugees and aliens to
Somalia, such an action would be in direct contravention of Article 33 of
the Refugee Convention and would violate international human rights law.
A third troublesome practice of the U.S.' removal policy is that in
some instances the U.S. government fails to notify the receiving country
that criminal aliens will be removed to its soil. This failure results in "serious offenders [being] deposited unannounced at international airports.

28

Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1.1, adopted on Oct. 4, 1967,
19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
24 Refoulement is "when a refugee is returned to any place where ... her life or
freedom is at risk because of persecution, be it the refugee's country of origin or
any other country." HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, AN UNJUST "VISION" FOR EUROPE'S
REFUGEES 4 (June 17, 2003), available at http://hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/refugees0603/refugees061803.pdf.
25 G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10 1984).
26 8 C.F.R. 208.18(a)(1) (2005).
27 See D-Muhumed v. U.S. Attorney General, 388 F.3d 814, 820(l1th Cir. 2004).
23

D-Muhumed fails to demonstrate that the harm he suffered was
inflicted at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence
of, a public official. The objective evidence indicates that
Somalia currently has no central government, and the clans who
control various sections of the country do so through continued
warfare and not through official power. Hence, D-Muhumed's
claim for CAT relief falls.
Id.

Margaret H. Taylor & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Deportation of Criminal
Aliens: A Geopolitical Perspective, INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE WORKING PAPER
28
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For example, "busloads of Mexican nationals [were shuffled] across the
border, where they ...[disembarked] in the middle of the night with no

notice to Mexican authorities. '29 Thus, receiving countries lose the opportunity "to register the presence of criminal offenders, to check for outstanding warrants on deportees, and to assist their reintegration into society." 30
At the Caribbean Summit in 1997, President Clinton agreed in the
Barbados Declaration to provide advance notification of the removal of
criminal aliens to receiving countries. The Immigration & Naturalization
Services (INS) subsequently instructed its officers to give at least three days
notice before the arrival of criminal aliens to the receiving countries. 1 In
addition, the Barbados Declaration provided that the U.S. would prove that
the removed alien is a national or citizen of the receiving country and the
U.S. government would also provide information about the alien and circumstances leading to her removal.3 2 The countries that signed the Barbados agreement "claim that little if anything has been done by the U.S. to
33
follow through on [its] agreement.
The U.S.' failure to provide receiving countries with advance notice
of the arrival of criminal aliens has caused significant problems in these
countries. In Central America and the Caribbean, aliens removed from the
U.S. are blamed for escalating crime rates. Because receiving countries
cannot effectively combat problems posed by the U.S.' removal of criminal
aliens, they have enforced harsh laws indiscriminately, such as the mano
dura law in Central America and the indefinite detention of deportees in
horrible prison conditions in Haiti. In many receiving countries, the governments do not know how to combat the problems that result from the
U.S.' removal process.
THE INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS OF THE U.S.' REMOVAL POLICY

The U.S.' removal process is problematic and in some cases has
wreaked havoc on receiving countries. Many receiving countries are developing and are politically and economically unstable. Removal of criminal
(June 1998), available at http://www.iadialog.org/publications/program-reports/

taylorcriminal.htm.
29

Id.

30

Id.

31

Id.

32

Privat Precil, Productions: Briefing on Haiti, Criminal Deportees and Re-

turned Teens, A Migration Phenomenon,A Social Problem, THE PANOS INSTITUTE
(May 1999), available at http://www.panoscaribbean.org/productions/haitibrief-

ings/h-02-e.php.
33

Id.
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aliens poses additional threats that receiving countries cannot effectively
combat. Therefore, some receiving countries have resorted to harsh alternatives to combat these problems. This paper will examine the problems and
reactions that have occurred in Haiti and Central America.
The Human Rights of Criminal Aliens in Haiti
Although the U.S. removes a relatively small number of criminal
aliens to HaitiP 4 in comparison to other countries in the Caribbean or Central America, these deportees are a "grave concern to those responsible for
public security."3 5 Since the late 1990s, the Haitian government has been
concerned with instability. Haiti has a rampant crime rate and is a significant transshipment point for drug trafficking1 6 Furthermore, over twothirds of the people in Haiti are not formally employed.3 7 In light of these
problems, the Haitian economy cannot efficiently absorb aliens removed
from the U.S.
Some Haitian officials worry that these deportees, who are unable
to speak French or Creole and who have no ties to Haiti, will resort to
criminal behavior to survive.38 Furthermore, the Haitian government has not
had, and continues to lack, the financial resources to create and maintain
social services necessary to integrate these newly removed aliens.
As a result of the Haitian government's security concerns, Haiti has
enacted polices which greatly deviate from the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of Human
In 2004, Haiti encountered political turmoil after President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was removed from power. Nick Caistor, Challenges Ahead for Haiti's Preval,
BBC NEWS, Feb. 16, 2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/
4721510.stm. Rene Preval, elected President in February 2006, planned to "revive
Haiti's parlous economy, boost exports, and create new jobs." Id. Even though
this article focuses on events that occurred before Aristide's removal, some of the
analysis contained therein continues to be relevant to Haiti's present day situation.
35 Precil, supra note 32.
34

36

U.S. STATE DEP'T, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, CONSULAR INFORMATION

SHEET HAITI

(May 22, 2006) available at http:/travel.state.gov/travel/cis-pa-tw/

cis/cis_1 134.html; CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACT BOOK:
HAITI (2005), available at https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ha.

html.
37

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACT BOOK:

HAITI,

supra note

36.
Andy Kershaw, Haiti's Desperate Deportees, BBC NEWS, CROSSING CONTINENTS, Jan. 10, 2002, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/programmes/crossingcontinents/americas/1057930. stm.
38
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Rights (UDHR). First, Haiti does not adhere to the due process requirements as called for in international human rights law. Article 14 of the
ICCPR provides in part that a person should "be informed promptly and in
detail in a language which he understands of the nature and cause of the
charge against him"3 9 and "[t]o be tried without undue delay."' 4 In Haiti,
"U]udicial dockets are clogged, and fair and expeditious trials are the exception rather than the rule."'4 1 Frequently, judges' orders to release inmates
are ignored. 42 In addition, "criminal deportees who already have served
sentences outside the country are kept in jail, with no timetable for their
43
eventual release"
Second, Haiti indefinitely and arbitrarily detains criminal deportees.
In doing so, Haiti violates UDHR Article 9 which states that no one shall be
detained arbitrarily. 44 Upon arrival at the International Airport of Port-auPrince, criminal aliens removed from the U.S. are immediately incarcerated
at Haiti's National Penitentiary. 45 They are held in prisons without being
charged and without knowing when they will be released. Criminal deportees who have family members in Haiti are fortunate because a Haitian
family member can secure a deportee's release by proving that she is related
to the deportee and by guaranteeing that she will be responsible for the
deportee. The relative signs a document attesting that she will be subject to
arrest until the deportee is apprehended if that deportee commits a crime
and flees. Michelle Karshan, the Director of Alternative Chance, explains
that:
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2000A (XXI),
at art. 14, 3, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966).
39

40

Id.

41

U.S. STATE DEP'T, HAITI:

COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES

(2000), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hirpt/2000/wha/795.htm.
42 Id.
43

Id.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights [hereinafter UDHR], G.A. Res. 217A,
at art. 9, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
45 Precil, supra note 32; U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, INS RESOURCE INFORMATION CENTER, Response to Query No. HTI0100l.ASM, HAITI:
44

INFORMATION ON CONDITIONS IN HAITIAN PRISONS AND TREATMENT OF CRIMINAL

(2002), available at http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.
5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=46d6361cfb98dOlOVgnVCMIO
000048f3d6a 1RCRD&vgnextchannel=D2d 1e89390b5d0lOVgnVCM 10000048f3d
6alRCRD.
DEPORTEES

2006

COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
[i]n 2001, 4-5 families have been subjected to arrest, with
one family member imprisoned for three months until the
police were able to arrest the deportee. This deters some
families from coming forward or following through with
the process for releasing their loved one from detention
46
when first deported to Haiti.

Deportees, who do not have Haitian family members willing to claim responsibility for them remain incarcerated indefinitely. 47 In some instances,
bogus "lawyers" promise to give them their freedom in exchange for
49
bribes. 48 Upon paying such bribes, the deportees often remain in prison.
Third, due to the lack of adequate prison structures, appalling conditions in Haitian prisons and the Haitian policy of detaining criminal deportees on arrival, Haiti further violates international human rights laws.
The horrendous prison conditions are in direct contravention of Article 5 of
the UDHR which provides that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." 50 There is no question that Haitian prison conditions constitute cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment and punishment.5 1 There, detainees do not have adequate drinking water, they rely on relatives and friends to provide them with food, and
are crammed into tiny cells without adequate lighting. 52 There are also re53
ports of 17 U.S. deportees being held in a four-by-four meter cell.
Michelle Karshan further describes the conditions in a Haitian prison as
follows:
46

U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES,

supra note 45 (quoting Letter

from Michelle Karshan, Dir. of Alternative Chance, 2000).
47

Id.

48

Kershaw, supra note 38.

49

Id.

50 UDHR, supra note 44, at art. 5.
51

The prison conditions in Haiti's detention facilities also violate the Economic

and Social Counsel's Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners
(Minimum Rules), which details the country's requirement to provide adequate detention facilities. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, E.S.C.
Res. 663C (XXIV), at 15, U.N. Doc. E/ 5922 (May 13, 1977). According to the
Minimum Rules, the country shall provide detainees "with water and with such
toilet articles as are necessary for health and cleanliness." Id. In addition, the Minimum Rules require that prisoners be provided with nutritional food and adequate
drinking water. Id.
52 Kershaw, supra note 38.
53

Id.
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These holding cells have no toilets and no sinks. Usually
those wishing to use a toilet must use a bag to defecate in
or they urinate in a communal bucket which stays inside the
cell .... [T]hese cells range in temperature from 80-105

degrees during the day. There is no light provided and...
the CDs [criminal deportees] are packed in an extremely
hot cell which is dark at all times. The CDs are not provided any chairs, beds or mats to sleep on or sit on and are
therefore sleeping altogether directly on cement floors ....
In some of the cells when it rains the cell is flooded and the
CDs must get up from the cement floor and use their own
clothes to mop up the floor. It is then impossible to sleep
given the flooding conditions of the cells . .

.

. While in

these holding cells no food is provided to the CDs and they
must depend on a family member to bring them food. Unfortunately, many of the CDs have no relatives in Haiti ....
While in these holding cells, the CDs are only provided
access to tap water. The water is contaminated and is [sic]
extremely high risk to everyone. Unless boiled for a period
of 20 minutes, tap water can typically transmit typhoid fever, hepatitis, parasites, amoebas. The CDs have no possibility to boil water ....CDs must wash their clothes (often

without soap) and hang them in the cell to dry although
there may be no ventilation in the cell. Problems of properly washing clothes contribute to fungus infections or parasite infestations which quickly become open and infected
sores .... There is no medical care for CDs held in police

station holding cells. There are no doctors available to diagnose or treat sick CDs. There is no medicine available to
54
treat CDs in holding cells.
55
As a result of these conditions, there is a high death rate among inmates.
In addition to the harsh prison conditions, there is evidence that
U.S. deportees are often abused by prison officials. The State Department

recognizes that "[p]olice mistreatment of suspects ...

remains pervasive in

all parts of the country. Beating with fists, sticks, and belts is by far the
most common form of abuse." 56 There is also documented evidence that
supra note 46 (quoting Letter
from Michelle Karshan, Dir. of Alternative Chance, 2000).
55 U.S. STATE DEP'T, supra note 41.
54

U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES,

56

Id.
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prison officials burned inmates with cigarettes, choked them, hooded them,
and severely boxed them in the ears.5 7 These deplorable prison conditions
and the torture of criminal deportees are serious violations of international
human rights.
In a 2002 decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals held that
Haitian prison conditions do not constitute torture under immigration regulations; therefore, Haitian aliens may not receive relief from removal based
on CAT claims.5 8 This allows more aliens to be deported to Haiti because
they cannot seek relief from removal based on horrendous Haitian prison
conditions. 59 Therefore, even more criminal aliens will be incarcerated in
Haiti, further burdening the Haitian penitentiary system.
The U.S. should be concerned with the collateral effects that its
removal policy has on Haiti because its policy frustrates the U.S. goal of
promoting democracy throughout the world. In the 1990s, the U.S. was
committed to fostering and strengthening democracy in Haiti and helped
return Haiti's first democratically President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power
in 1994.60 The U.S. poured millions of dollars into the Haitian economy to
build a democratic society. Nevertheless, the U.S. continues to remove
criminal aliens to Haiti without offering any assistance to relieve the
problems posed by them. These aliens cannot assimilate into Haitian society and may resort to criminal behavior to survive in Haiti. The rise in
crime rates causes further instability in a country with an already weak
democratic infrastructure. Furthermore, the Haitian government violates
the basic premises of democracy by failing to provide criminal aliens with
due process and by holding aliens indefinitely.
The U.S.' removal policy could have domestic repercussions as
well by increasing the U.S.' crime rate and by making the war on drugs
more difficult to fight. It is usual for the U.S. to remove drug offenders to
57

Id.

In re J-E, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 302 (B.I.A. 2002) (recognizing that there are
circumstances in which Haitian police actions could constitute torture, but that they
are isolated instances); but see Azanor v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1013, 1020 (9th Cir.
2004) (explaining that the Board of Immigration Appeals misused the regulations
in In re J-E because "it impermissibly prevents aliens from seeking relief under the
Torture Convention for claims based on threats of torture when not in official custody"). This disagreement only applies to the 9th Circuit; In re J-E is still good law
in other circuits.
59 See, e.g., In re J-E, 23 I. & N., supra note 58.
60 Felicia Swindells, Note, U.N. Sanctions in Haiti: A Contradiction Under Articles 41 and 55 of the U.N. Charter, 20 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1878, 1918 n.258 (June
1997).
58
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Haiti. For instance, in 1998 half of the criminal aliens removed to Haiti
were convicted of drug offenses in the U.S. 6 1 Haitians who are removed
from the U.S. may later return to the U.S. Since Haiti is "a major transshipment point for South American narcotics .

.

. being sent to the United

States,' 62 the movement of Haitians between Haiti and the U.S. will increase communication networks among drug circles. This increased communication and travel will effectuate the growth of an international drug
market with Haiti as an intermediary point for drug shipments. As a result,
drugs may easily be brought into the U.S. by the return of aliens previously
removed from the U.S. An increase in the drug supply in the U.S. will
cause drug related crimes to increase. The potential drug trafficking increase will frustrate the U.S.' efforts to fight the war on drugs and to halt
the international drug trade. The U.S. contradicts the objectives of the war
on drugs by dumping criminal aliens on Haitian soil without giving Haiti
any assistance to combat the problems associated with these deportees.
Therefore, the U.S. should reconsider and fully analyze the effects of removing criminal aliens to countries that cannot manage the threats they
pose.
The Creation of a Gang Culture in CentralAmerica

Even more so than Haiti, the U.S.' deportation policy has affected
Central America by fostering a gang culture there. Since 1996, Central
America has been the recipient of an overwhelming portion of U.S. deportees. About one-fourth of removed aliens returning to Guatemala and Hon63
duras have criminal records.
In recent years, gang members from the Los Angeles Mara 64 Salvatrucha 13 (MS 13)61 and Mara 18 (18th Street Gang) were removed to Central America. Many of these gang members had lived in the U.S. since they
61

Precil, supra note 32.
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U.S. STATE DEP'T, BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, BACKGROUND

NOTES: HAITI
63 Taylor &

(2005), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1982.htm.

Aleinikoff, supra note 28.
64 Maras means "gang" in Spanish. Patzy Vazquez, Guatemala Prison Riots Kill
Dozens, CNN (Aug. 15, 2005), available at www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/americas/08/15/guatemala.prison.riots/index.html.
Mara Salvatrucha Gang in US and Central America (NPR broadcast Mar. 17,
2005). See also Gang Violence (CNN television broadcast Apr. 14, 2005) [hereinafter Gang Violence] (An ICE officer described MS 13 as "a unique gang, comprised primarily of foreign nationals originating from Central America, primarily El
Salvador. They're transnational. They have a history of violence. They're very
predatory in nature and extremely violent.").
65
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were young children and many did not speak Spanish. Upon removal, these
gang members failed to reintegrate into their native countries so they resorted to their U.S. lifestyle and formed gangs in Central America. 66 These
gangs recruited local members, thereby allowing the gang culture to grow
throughout Central America. 67 The gang growth is also attributable to "lim' 68
ited economic opportunities and weak law enforcement.
It is estimated that Honduras has 35,000 gang members, El Salva69
dor has 30,000 gang members and Guatemala has 14,000 gang members.
Central American countries blame the increased domestic crime rate on
gangs and the U.S.' removal of criminal aliens.70 Even though there is little
research attesting to the correlation between increased crime rates and criminal deportees, many diplomats find that recent deportees are a significant
contributing factor "for sharply rising crime rates throughout Central
71
America."
Central America is not equipped financially or socially to handle
such deportees.7 2 In an effort to combat the dangers, Central American
governments enacted harsh laws known as mano dura (Spanish for "firm
hand") that target current and former gang members. In some Central
American countries, mano dura laws gave authorities the ability to incarcerate people simply for having a gang tattoo. 73 After the passage of the mano
dura laws in El Salvador, the Salvadoran police "registered some 19,275
arrests on gang-related charges" between 2003 and 2004. 74 El Salvador's
66

Taylor & Aleinikoff, supra note 28.

Gangs and Crime in Latin America: Hearing Before the Comm. on House International Relations Subcomm. on the Western Hemisphere, 108th Cong. 93-113
(2005) (testimony of Stephen C. Johnson, The Heritage Foundation) [hereinafter
Hearing].
68 Id at 102.
69 S.Lynne Walker, Gang Members Deported From US Take Deadly Culture to
Their Home Countries, COPLEY NEWS SERV., Jan. 18, 2005.
70 Taylor & Aleinikoff, supra note 28.
71 Id. See also Walker, supra note 69.
72 Walker, supra note 69.
73 Id. (showing the prejudice that former gang members experience because they
have tattoos). See also Amnesty International, El Salvador: UnconstitutionalLaw
Should Be Repealed and New Approaches to Public Security Considered,AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL PRESS, June 16, 2004, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/
print/ENGAMR290052004 [hereinafter AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL PRESS]; Diego
Cevallos, Rights-Central America: The War on Gangs - To Stop Gang Wars, INTER -PRESS SERV., Oct. 4, 2004.
74 Hearing, supra note 67.
67
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Supreme Court of Justice has since found the mano dura laws unconstitutional. However, similar mano dura legislation was enacted in Honduras,
making gang membership a crime punishable by up to twelve years in
prison. 75 Honduran authorities claim that kidnapping, car thefts and gang
related murders have dramatically declined since Honduras passed the strict
anti-maras laws. 76 The government in Chiapas, Mexico passed a similar
law allowing for a five-year prison sentence for merely belonging to a
gang. 77 Simply phrased, these mano dura laws called for the arrest of "any7
one looking like or being associated with gang members.
As a result of the mano dura and other harsh laws enacted by Central American governments, these countries' penitentiary systems were
overwhelmed. 79 El Salvador's prison population doubled in the past five
years. 80 In August 2004, there was a riot in El Salvador's La Esperanza
Prison in which a battle erupted between the 400 Mara 18 member-inmates
and other inmates, and which culminated in grenades exploding inside the
82
prison. 81 Thirty-one inmates died as a result of the riot.
Other countries in Central America have experienced riots, fires
and other problems as a result of overcrowded prisons.83 Increased incarceration rates and strengthened enforcement measures, however, did not
satisfy Central Americans' need for security and protection. In El Salvador,
the Sombra Negra, a vigilante death squad, policed streets and neighborGang Violence, supra note 65; Walker, supra note 69. See also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL PRESS, supra note 73 (noting that the Supreme Court of Justice of El
Salvador ruled that mano dura laws were unnecessary because appropriate legislation to deal with gang activity already existed, and found all articles in the mano
dura law to be a breach of the constitution since mano dura laws violated the basic
15

principles of equality before the law). El Salvador has since passed the Super
Mano Dura laws, a revised version of the mano dura laws.
76 Hearing, supra note 67.
77 Walker, supra note 69.
Mara Salvatrucha Gang in US and Central America, supra note 65.
Mary Jordan, Central America's Gang Crisis: Prison Riots Reflect Widening
Violence in Poor Nations, THE WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2004, at Al.
80 Hearing, supra note 67.
81 Jordan, supra note 79.
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ed., May 22, 2004, at 31 (reporting that 103 gang members died in a prison fire that
swept through an overcrowded prison in San Pedro Sula in Honduras on May 17,
2004); Hearing, supra note 67 (noting that prisons in Honduras hold twice their
capacity).
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hoods which were threatened by gangs.8 4 The Sombra Negra acted on the
belief that the country's judicial branch failed to adequately enforce justice.
The death squad killed accused criminals who had been "released by judges
due to lack of evidence."8 5 It was even implied that "Sombra Negra select[ed] its targets based on the theory that human rights protect
criminals. ' 86 Due to the widespread maras fear that plagued the Salvadoran
population, many Salvadorans supported the Sombra Negra's actions because it helped to eliminate gang violence in their neighborhoods. 87 There
was speculation that "the new death squads operate[d] with the blessing of
the [Salvadoran] government. '88 Similarly, in Honduras, authorities investigated allegations that death squads in Tegucigalpa murdered over fifty
89
gang members.
The U.S. deported its gang crisis abroad in an effort to alleviate
domestic problems. However, the removal of these aliens created a global
problem that will likely harm the U.S. in the future. 90 The threat has begun
at the street level in Central America because removed gang members teach
local youth about gang culture and how to be savvy members. Tough legislation in Central American countries allow many deported gang members to
be imprisoned with native inmates, thereby creating prisons that are "gang
colleges" where non-gang inmates learn about and join gangs. 91 In these
Lawrence Michael Ladutke, Expression For and Against the Vigilante Death
Squad Sombra Negra, 8 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 283, 288 (2001-02).
85 Id. See also Ray Sanchez, Marked For Death: El Salvador's Tattooed Teens
Face "Shadow", NEWSDAY CITY ED., July 4, 1995, at All (Teens with gang tat84

toos worry that they will be targeted by the death squads. Some teens have therefore attempted to remove their tattoos with cheese graters and acid.).
86 Ladutke, supra note 84, at 288.
87

Id. at 299-300 ("In January 1995 .... residents of San Miguel set off fireworks

in celebration of one of the death squad's summary executions." In addition, "[a]n
article in La Prensa Grafica suggested that social cleansing death squads were effective in establishing peace in gang ravaged communities such as Chalchuapa.").
See also Sanchez, supra note 85 ("The level of hopelessness and insecurity among
Salvadorans is so high that people feel unprotected and view these groups as saviors,' said Victoria Marina de Aviles, [the nation's top human rights official].").
88 Sanchez, supra note 85.
89 Tim Rogers, CentralAmerica's Uneasy Disarmament, 39 N.A.C.L.A. REP. ON
AM. 12 (July 1, 2005).

"The world is too global to export a problem and not expect it to come back."
Walker, supra note 69 (quoting Prof. David Brotherton, John Jay College of Criminal Justice.).
91
Robert J. Lopez, Rich Connell, Chris Kraul, MS-13: An International
90
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settings, gangs gain strength, unify and create a more advanced gang
system.
The continued growth of gangs internationally may become a threat
to the U.S. Immigration authorities are aware that deported gang members
re-enter the U.S. without documentation. 92 The quick turn-around cycle of
gang members who are removed to Central America and subsequently return to the U.S. fosters international ties and international organization. 93
These already experienced individuals develop stronger networks through
removal than they would have had they remained in the U.S. For example,
it has been reported that "Mexican and Colombian traffickers now reportedly use [gang members] to distribute narcotics in the [U.S.]. M
Moreover, removed gang members still have ties to the U.S.
through family members and friends; therefore, communication between
those that are removed and those that remain in the U.S. further strengthens
networks to facilitate international crime and drug trafficking. As recently
as October 2005, "[n]ewly organized [gang] cells in El Salvador have returned to establish strongholds in metropolitan Washington, D.C., and other
U.S. cities. Prisons in El Salvador have become nerve centers .

.

. where

deported leaders from Los Angeles communicate with gang cliques across
the [U.S.]." 95 A new gang created in El Salvador, known as the Marineros,
has already developed cells in Washington, D.C. 96 These advanced networks may pose a future threat to the U.S. through organized crime and
drug trafficking. 97 The U.S. must amend its removal process and address
the problems created by its own practices.
ALLEVIATING THE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE

U.S.'

REMOVAL POLICY

Although the U.S.' removal policy has wreaked havoc on many
countries that receive criminal aliens, the U.S. can change its removal policy to alleviate the distress endured by receiving countries. Aleinikoff and
Taylor investigated and reported four options which would alleviate some
Salvatruchais Rooted Locally, But It Has Become a Force in CentralAmerica and
the Washington Area. U.S. Policy Provided UnintendedAid, L. A. TIMES, Oct. 30,
2005, at Al.
92 Hearing, supra note 67.
93 See generally id.
94 Id.
95

Lopez, supra note 91.

Id.
Although "[deported gang members] pose no immediate national threat to the
United States, there is potential, however [for the maras to pose a larger threat than
they already do]." Hearing, supra note 67.
96

97
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of this distress. They argue that the U.S. should create "additional procedural reforms to improve the process of criminal alien removals," the U.S.
should give aid to receiving countries, foreign born offenders should be
incarcerated in their country of origin, and the government should relax its
98
enforcement efforts or restore relief from removal.
Regarding additional procedural reforms, Aleinikoff and Taylor advocate that the U.S. should provide receiving countries with advanced and
enhanced notice regarding aliens that the U.S. plans to remove to the other
territory. 99 They maintain that enhanced notification should include the
alien's criminal background history.100 In addition, Aleinikoff and Taylor
suggest that the U.S. should assist in the border processing of these deportees and prevent "midnight dumping." 10 1 Their study also proposes that the
U.S. should consider negotiating interior repatriation agreements with re10 2
ceiving countries.
Second, Aleinikoff and Taylor recommend that the U.S. provide aid
to the receiving countries to support domestic law enforcement and to assist
in reintegrating deportees. 10 3 They advise that this aid could take various
forms, such as helping to establish social services that assist criminal aliens
to reintegrate into the receiving countries' societies or teaching local law
10 4
enforcement how to maintain criminal databases.
Third, Aleinikoff and Taylor suggest that foreign-born offenders
should be incarcerated in their country of origin. 10 5 They evaluate this option "primarily because it is so prevalent in the current policy discussions
about criminal aliens,"' 1 6 not because it is aimed "at reducing the numbers
or alleviating the problems created by criminal alien deportations."' 10 7 The
U.S. has signed treaty transfers with several countries allowing foreign-born
offenders to serve their sentence in their country of origin as long as the
foreign-born inmate consents to the transfer. 08 Aleinikoff and Taylor find
98
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100 Id.
101 Id. Midnight dumping, as explained in the introduction of this article, is where
the U.S. leaves buses full of Mexican immigrants on Mexican territory without
notifying the Mexican officials of their arrival.
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that transfers would be beneficial because "the states could save money and
alleviate prison overcrowding . . "109 These transfers, Aleinikoff and Taylor argue, might "help to further [the foreign-born offender's] rehabilitation
and reintegration into their country of origin." 110
Finally, Aleinikoff and Taylor strongly advise that the U.S. reduce
the number of criminal alien removals. By easing up on enforcement efforts, amending the definition of aggravated felony, and offering relief from
removal, Aleinikoff and Taylor believe that the amount of criminal alien
removals will have less of an impact on receiving countries."'
Aleinikoff and Taylor's research and suggestions are well developed and were applicable to the U.S. in 1998. Eight years have elapsed
since Aleinikoff and Taylor published their research. Since then, the U.S.
has experienced the terrorist attacks of September 11 th and has focused on
the war on terrorism. This section will explore Aleinikoff and Taylor's
suggestions in light of current conditions in the U.S.
The U.S. is least likely to adopt the suggestions to incarcerate aliens
in their country of origin for crimes committed in the U.S. and to provide
U.S. monetary assistance or in-kind assistance to receiving countries to
combat the problems posed by criminal aliens. Aleinikoff and Taylor's
suggestions to modify U.S. removal procedures, to change the definition of
aggravated felony, and to provide equitable relief from removal are the
most logical solution to the problems.
First, Aleinikoff and Taylor's suggestion to incarcerate foreign born
offenders in their countries of origin is problematic because it will only
exacerbate the problems that receiving countries currently encounter with
criminal aliens. Simply placing criminal aliens in prison on foreign soil
does not eliminate the need to reintegrate them. If all U.S. deportees are
incarcerated in the same facility, then the facility could operate as a college
for gang members like the Ciudad Barrios penitentiary in San Miguel, El
Salvador. 1 2 Ciudad Barrios is considered a college for gang members
where the inmates learn gang techniques from one another and further
strengthen their gang ties." 3
In addition, human rights may be violated when aliens are incarcerated in their countries of origin. For instance, as aforementioned, Haitian
prisons violate many international human rights laws. Similarly, if the U.S.
created agreements with receiving countries regarding incarcerating aliens
109
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in the receiving countries' territories, the U.S. would have an interest in
monitoring the conditions of the prisons to ensure that human rights are
protected. Therefore, the U.S. may also have to fund projects to build more
prisons or to help train officials in maintaining prison facilities. Considering the large deficit created by the current administration, it would be
highly unlikely that it would fund a program to build prisons abroad.
Aleinikoff and Taylor optimistically suggest that the U.S. government provide monetary aid and assistance to receiving countries. It seems
unlikely that the U.S. government will directly allocate funding to receiving
countries to combat the problems associated with aliens. There is scant
research dealing with the problems posed by criminal aliens who are removed and even less debate about it in the U.S. Through research and
lobbying efforts, nonprofit organizations, immigration advocates and scholars would be able to draw the U.S. government's attention to the problems
associated with its removal policies. When such problems are well-documented, only then will the U.S. government consider reserving funding for
problems posed by criminal aliens.
Although providing funding to receiving countries is currently an
idealistic suggestion, such funding would tremendously assist receiving
countries to combat problems posed by criminal deportees. The U.S. government could provide aid to help establish social reintegration for deportees. Specifically, this aid could prevent deportees from resorting to
criminal behavior to survive in their new country. This aid could, for example, include language and cultural classes. Through repatriation agreements, the U.S. and receiving countries could establish social organizations
to train deportees for employment and to help with the transition to life in
the receiving countries. Perhaps even prior to removal, the U.S. government could provide language classes to the alien.
Alternative Chance in Haiti is an example of an organization the
U.S. government could fund to help reintegrate deportees into their countries of origin. Alternative Chance, a nonprofit with offices in the U.S. and
Haiti, is the first reintegration program in the Americas.1 14 This program
integrates criminal deportees from the U.S. and Canada into Haitian society. 115 Alternative Chance offers an orientation process where deportees are
taught about "the history of Haiti, the transition from army to a civilian
police, the government structure and the Constitution."' 1 6 As part of this
program, "peer counselors share vital information on survival, such as why
one should not drink the water, and how to live non-violently and create a
114
115
116
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productive life in Haiti."' 117 Haitian authorities recognize that projects like
Alternative Chance's reintegration program "give deportees an orientation
to help with their new life."'1 18 The U.S. and receiving countries, or the U.S.
alone, could offer financial aid and in-kind assistance to establish nonprofits
or international organizations similar to Alternative Chance to acclimate
and integrate recent deportees into their countries of origin.
In addition, the U.S. government could provide receiving countries
with database information about and enforcement methods on combating
gang problems. The U.S. could collaborate with the receiving nations to
"spearhead cooperative efforts against deported drug traffickers who build
international networks to enhance their trade." 119 In October 2004, the Director General of El Salvador's National Civilian Police and law enforcement officials from Southern California met to discuss the sharing of
information on criminals. 120 More efforts should be made at the local level
to allow database sharing. 121 If both the U.S. and the receiving counties
have access to the same information, they will be better able to combat the
problems that occur. Through cooperation, the U.S. will attain the best results to protect its interests in national security and foreign affairs.
Since Congress is attempting to overhaul the current immigration
system, Aleinikoff and Taylor's more realistic and most ripe recommendation is that the U.S. relax its enforcement efforts, change the definition of
aggravated felony and offer equitable relief from removal. The U.S. must
reassess the aliens that it is removing because not all removable aliens pose
a current or future threat to U.S. public safety or national security. Under
the current removal policy, many aliens are removed for simple theft or
marijuana possession; many are petty criminals. Of Aleinikoff and Taylor's
recommendations, this one could be easily enacted. Likewise, equitable relief could be easily enacted. This relief could be similar to INA 212(c)
relief 122 and suspension of deportation 123 which were previously available to
deportable aliens who met certain requirements. Such relief need not frns117
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118
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Hearing, supra note 67.
This option may pose concerns regarding the violation of criminals' privacy
rights. Therefore, if this option is enacted it should be monitored carefully.
122 INA 212(c) "allowed long-time permanent residents to keep their permanent
resident status despite having committed a deportable offense." Charles Gordon,
Stanley Mailman, & Steven Yale-Loehr, Section 212(c): Waiver of Inadmissibility
or Deportabilityfor Long-Time Residents (Pre-IIRAIRA Law), IMMIGRATION LAW
AND PROCEDURE § 74.04(2). To be eligible for a waiver of deportability, the alien
120
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trate the goals of the U.S.' removal policy. Instead, relief may be offered in
limited situations for aliens who are qualified to receive it. Equitable relief
could relieve the domestic social costs that the U.S. incurs as a result of its
removal policy. Furthermore, as Aleinikoff and Taylor advocate, equitable
relief will alleviate the problems receiving countries encounter because
fewer aliens will be removed. Receiving countries will not be as overwhelmed as they currently are with the mass influx of criminal deportees.
The best option for the U.S. would be to improve the process of
criminal alien removals. The U.S. government should make it a priority to
provide receiving countries with advance notice of aliens being removed to
their territories. By simply providing three or four days notice, receiving
countries can prepare for the aliens' arrival. With more notice, receiving
countries' officials could "check local and national criminal databases and
arrest any immigrants with outstanding warrants."' 124 Furthermore, advance
notice will give receiving countries the opportunity to implement a system
to acclimate these aliens to their new surroundings and to be prepared for
the types of assistance the aliens will need upon re-entering society. With
advance notice, the receiving government may also be able to contact the
removed alien's family so she will have a place to go upon arrival.
[m]ust have been lawfully admitted for permanent residence and
be continuing in that status; [m]ust be returning to a lawful unrelinquished U.S. domicile of seven consecutive years after a temporary absence abroad, or be maintaining such a domicile; [m]ust
have departed voluntarily and not under an order of deportation,
if he or she is entering the country; [m]ay be excludable on any
grounds ("other than paragraphs (3) and (9)(C)" of INA section
212(a)) or deportable on any analogous grounds; and [m]ay not
be 'deportable by reason of having committed' any one of several
criminal offenses including: aggravated felonies, controlled substance offenses, certain firearms offenses, miscellaneous crimes
relating to national security, or two or more crimes involving
moral turpitude.
Id. In determining whether to exercise discretion, the immigration judge would
weigh adverse and favorable factors.

Pre-IIRIRA, suspension of deportation was "a process to confer lawful permanent residence on certain deportable noncitizens with protracted residence. Application for this relief [was] made only in a deportation proceeding." Charles
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In addition to providing advance notice, the U.S. could enter into
repatriation agreements with receiving countries. A repatriation agreement
would detail how removals would be effectuated between the U.S. and the
receiving country. In 2000, the U.S. signed such a repatriation agreement
with Portugal. 125 The Portuguese government expressed concern over the
126
increasing number of U.S. criminal deportees resettling on the Azores.
After the passage of IIRIRA, the U.S. deported several hundred aliens to the
Azores. 127 The Portuguese residents opposed the arrival of these aliens because the Azores previously had a virtually nonexistent crime rate. 128 In the
protocol, the U.S. agreed to give Portugal advance notification and specific
129
information about the aliens being deported.
A repatriation agreement, like the one between the U.S. and Portugal, will facilitate the processing of an aliens removal and will also provide
the receiving country with notice. Also, the receiving country may be more
likely to cooperate with the U.S.' removal efforts. Overall, repatriation
agreements offer a reasonable solution to problems posed by the U.S.' removal policy. It is also the most likely to be enacted under the current
administration because it will not require much funding and will not inhibit
the U.S. from removing criminal aliens.
CONCLUSION

The current U.S. removal policy is shortsighted. It is a quick fix to
problems posed by non-citizens in the U.S. As a result of this quick fix, the
U.S. is forcing deportees onto receiving countries that do not necessarily
have the resources, whether financial or social, to accommodate the deportees. Many receiving countries are at a loss as they develop plans to receive
deportees. To secure its unstable society, Haiti, for example, incarcerates
deportees indefinitely in some instances. Other countries, such as those in
Central America, do not detain deportees upon arrival, but have enacted
laws which prejudicially target deportees. Even when these Central American laws do not have enough muscle to combat the deportee problem, death
squads clean up what the legal system leaves behind. In summary, as a
125U.S.,
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result of the U.S.' removal policy, other countries are violating human
rights and international law.
The U.S. has an obligation to receiving countries to help combat the
problems posed by the U.S.' removal policy. If the U.S. does not act to
alleviate the pressures on these countries, then the U.S. may face future
repercussions, such as an increase in international criminal activity or possible threats to national security. The most realistic options for the U.S. are
to offer equitable relief from removal to aliens and to make repatriation
agreements with receiving countries. Through cooperative efforts, the U.S.'
removal policy need not continue its devastating consequences in receiving
countries.

